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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers state and federal government expansion of
genetic surveillance as a collateral consequence of a criminal record in
the context of a new biopolitics of race in America.  As I discuss more
fully in my book Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Busi-
ness Re-create Race in the Twenty-First Century, the emerging bio-
politics of race has three main components.1  First, some scientists are
resuscitating biological theories of race by modernizing old racial ty-
pologies that were based on observations of physical differences with
cutting-edge genomic research.2  These scientists are redefining race
as a biological category written in our genes.3  Second, the biotechnol-
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; faculty fellow, In-
stitute for Policy Research.  This Article is based on Chapter 11 of DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL
INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (New Press 2011).  I thank Tera Agyepong, Alan Bakhos, S.J. Chapman, and
Nicholas Gamse for excellent research assistance and the Kirkland & Ellis Fund for financial
support.
1. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND
BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (examining the politi-
cal implications of the use of a biological definition of race in genomic science and
biotechnologies).
2. Id. at 57-77.
3. Id. at 57-58.
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ogy and pharmaceutical industries are converting the new racial sci-
ence into products that are developed and marketed according to race
and that incorporate assumptions of racial difference at the genetic
level.4  Finally, government policies that appear to be colorblind are
stripping poor minority communities of basic services, social pro-
grams, and economic resources in favor of corporate interests, while
simultaneously imposing on these communities harsh forms of puni-
tive regulation.5  Mass incarceration and its collateral consequences
are the chief examples of the punitive regulation of African American
communities.  This Article contends that these dehumanizing policies
of surveillance and control are obscured by the emerging genetic un-
derstanding of race, which focuses attention on molecular differences
while ignoring the impact of racism in our society.6
Only a decade ago, the biological concept of race seemed to have
finally met its end.7  The Human Genome Project, which mapped the
entire human genetic code, proved that race could not be identified in
our genes.8  Yet, there has been an explosion of race-based science
and biotechnologies.  For example in 2005, the United States Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved the first race-specific
drug, BiDil, to treat heart failure in black patients.9  In addition, fertil-
ity clinics solicit egg donations based on race and use race in genetic
tests to determine which embryos to implant and which to discard.10
Consumers can send cheek swabs to dozens of online companies to
find out not only their genetic ancestry, but also their racial identity.11
4. Id. at 149-201, 226-57.
5. Id. at 300-08.
6. Dorothy Roberts, Race and the New Biocitizen, in WHAT’S THE USE OF RACE? MOD-
ERN GOVERNANCE AND THE BIOLOGY OF DIFFERENCE 259, 261 (Ian Whitmarsh & David Jones
eds., 2010) [hereinafter WHAT’S THE USE OF RACE?].
7. Id. at 262.
8. OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC’Y, PLAYING THE GENE CARD?: A
REPORT ON RACE AND HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY vii (2009), available at http://www.geneticsand
society.org/downloads/complete_PTGC.pdf.
9. Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the Production of
Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 (2004); see also Ian
Whitmarsh & David S. Jones, Governance and the Uses of Race, in WHAT’S THE USE OF RACE?,
supra note 6, at 7.
10. See Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the
Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. R. 319, 327 (2007); Dov Fox, Racial Classifica-
tion in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844, 1853 (2009); see generally Dorothy E. Rob-
erts, Race, Gender, and Genetic Technologies: A New Reproductive Dystopia?, 34 SIGNS 783
(2009), available at http://www.law.suffolk.edu/academic/health/pdf/Roberts_RaceGenderand
GeneticTechnology.pdf (exploring the role of race and racism in the emergence of reproductive
technologies that incorporate advances in genetic science).
11. OBASOGIE, supra note 8, at 25; Charmaine D. Royal et al., Inferring Genetic Ancestry:
Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications, 86 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 661, 661 (2010).
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Furthermore, one of these companies used the same forensic tools to
help law enforcement agencies identify the race of suspects.12
Most relevant to the subject of this Symposium, in the last dec-
ade, federal and state governments have been rapidly expanding the
collection of genetic information for law-enforcement purposes.13
With eight million offender samples, the U.S. federal government has
stockpiled the largest database of DNA seized from its citizens of any
country in the world.14 Because of rampant racial bias in arrests and
convictions, the government’s DNA databases, which are being
amassed nationwide, effectively constitute a race-based biotechnology
emerging from genetic science.15  Unlike voluntary genetic testing
technologies that claim to help people cure their diseases, improve the
genetic composition of their children, and find their identities, forensic
DNA repositories are gathered by the state without consent and main-
tained for the purpose of implicating people in crimes.16  Theses re-
positories signal the potential use of genetic technologies to reinforce
the racial order not only by incorporating a biological definition of
race, but also by imposing genetic regulation on the basis of race.
Part I of this Article reviews the expansion of DNA data banking
by states and the federal government, extending the collateral impact
of a criminal record—in the form of becoming a permanent suspect—
to growing categories of people.  Part II argues that the benefits of
this genetic surveillance in terms of crime detection, exonerations of
innocent inmates, and public safety do not outweigh the unmerited
collateral penalty of state invasion of individuals’ privacy and the
larger harms to democracy.  These harms are exacerbated by the dis-
proportionate collection of DNA from African Americans as a result
of deep racial biases in law enforcement.  Part III explains why DNA
databases reflect and help to perpetuate a Jim Crow system of crimi-
12. Pamela Sankar, Forensic DNA Phenotyping: Reinforcing Race in Law Enforcement, in
WHAT’S THE USE OF RACE?, supra note 6, at 49, 55; Duana Fullwiley, Can DNA ‘Witness’ Race?
Forensic Uses of an Imperfect Ancestry Testing Technology, GENEWATCH, Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 12
(2008), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org//pageDocuments/AJWLK7M1
AV.pdf.
13. See Justin A. Alfano, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection Challenges the
Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017, 1039 (2005).
14. See SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES xvi (2011).
15. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 309, 369-70 (2010).
16. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Databases for Law Enforcement: The Coverage
Question and the Case for a Population-Wide Databases, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 247, 268 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
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nal justice.  Finally, Part IV elaborates the racial harms that are
caused by genetic surveillance that targets large numbers of African
Americans, putting into practice deep-seated stereotypes about
blacks’ inherent criminality.  Far from correcting racial bias in law en-
forcement, the state’s use of DNA to designate millions of permanent
suspects reinforces the roots of racial injustice.
I. EXPANDING COLLECTIONS
Genetic testing was first introduced as a type of supplemental evi-
dence to help convict criminal suspects by comparing their DNA to
crime scene samples.17  Data banking extended the purpose of DNA
from confirming the guilt or innocence of particular suspects to de-
tecting unknown suspects from crime-scene evidence.18  The theory
was that law enforcement offenders could catch repeat offenders by
running genetic information gleaned from semen, blood, saliva, or
hair left by the perpetrator through a database containing genetic
profiles of prior lawbreakers.19  The DNA profiles function as “ge-
netic fingerprints” that can help match the crime scene sample with
one in the DNA database.20  A match—called a “cold hit”—might
save police months of investigation or help them catch a criminal who
would have otherwise eluded detection.21  Initially, DNA was col-
lected only from violent felons and sex offenders on the theory that
they were the most likely to commit crimes again and to leave genetic
evidence at the scene.22  Taking and storing genetic information from
these felons constituted a collateral penalty resulting from conviction
of a narrow set of crimes.23  The heinous nature of their crimes justi-
fied the state’s interference in their privacy.
The reach of this collateral penalty has extended drastically in the
last two decades.  Not only have the categories of people subject to
DNA seizure increased, but the government’s use of the banked DNA
has also broadened.  Throughout the 1990s, Congress dramatically en-
17. See Jill C. Schaefer, Profiling at the Cellular Level: The Future of the New York State
DNA Databanks, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 560 (2004).
18. See id. at 561.
19. See id. at 560-61.
20. Id. at 563.
21. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for
21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 644 n.40 (2000).
22. Schaefer, supra note 17, at 560.
23. See United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988) (defining a collat-
eral consequence as “one that is not related to the length or nature of the sentence imposed on
the basis of the plea”); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
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hanced the federal government’s authority to collect, analyze, and
permanently store DNA samples.24  The DNA Identification Act of
1994 provided funding for law enforcement agencies to amass DNA
into a giant federal repository, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(“FBI”) Combined DNA Index Systems (“CODIS”).25  Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and
the Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, which allocated fed-
eral funds for developing and upgrading DNA collection proce-
dures.26  The federal DNA databank contains not only samples
gathered by federal agents but also genetic profiles submitted to the
FBI by state law enforcement agencies.  All states, in turn, have access
to CODIS computerized data.  By linking federal and state databases,
law enforcement officers around the country can conduct interstate
investigations, matching DNA evidence to suspects at the local, state,
and national levels.
In the last decade, Congress passed a series of laws that gradually
cast the federal DNA net even wider.  The Patriot Act, passed in 2001
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, extended the scope of federal DNA
collection to terrorism-related crimes.27  The Justice for All Act of
2004 further widened the reach to all federal felonies and to additional
crimes of violence or sexual abuse.28  On January 5, 2006, President
George W. Bush signed into law, apparently without anyone noticing,
the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005—a stunning extension of govern-
ment power.29  Buried in the pages of the popular Violence Against
Women Act reauthorization bill, the DNA Fingerprint Act authorizes
U.S. agents to take and store DNA from anyone they arrest or detain
and permits CODIS to retain profiles from arrestees that were sub-
mitted by the states that collected their DNA.30  Citizens who have
not been convicted or charged with any crime and immigrants de-
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
25. See DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132-34 (2006).
26. See Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2006); Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 811, 110 Stat. 1214, 1312
(1996).
27. See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT Act”) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001).
28. See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2261, 2270 (2004).
29. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 34.
30. Id. at 34-35.
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tained on suspicion of Immigration and Naturalization Service viola-
tions may also have their profiles retained.31
A similar escalation is taking place at the state level.  All fifty
states now extract DNA from at least some classes of offenders and
send it to CODIS.32  Forty-seven states take a sample from anyone
convicted of a felony, and some states include misdemeanor offend-
ers.33  In eighteen states, people who are only arrested are forced to
submit DNA, even if they are never convicted of a crime.34  Thirty-
five states have extended their genetic collection law to children.35
Most states retain the actual DNA samples and not just the genetic
profiles derived from the samples, allowing investigators to mine them
for additional genetic information in the future.36  Half of states allow
the stored DNA samples to be used for purposes other than law en-
forcement, such as biomedical research.37
The State of California, which has amassed the third-largest DNA
database in the world, behind only the U.S. and British governments,
illustrates the cutting edge of state expansion.38  In 1998, the Califor-
nia legislature passed the DNA and Forensic Identification Database
and Databank Act to permit police to retrieve DNA from anyone,
including children, convicted of a felony, sex offense, or arson.39  By
2004, the California database had grown to 220,000 offender
profiles.40  However, law enforcement clamored for a wider net to
stockpile even more DNA samples for the database.41  Also in 2004,
Proposition 69, the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime, and Innocence
Protection Act, was placed on the ballot.42  The ballot initiative took a
giant leap beyond the current law; it broadened the scope of individu-
31. Julia Preston, U.S. Set to Begin a Vast Expansion of DNA Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/05/washington/05dna.html?_r=1.
32. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 29.
33. Id. at 38 (stating that only Idaho, Nebraska, and New Hampshire do not authorize DNA
collection from all felons).
34. Id. at 39 tbl.2.2, 41.
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id. at 237-38.
37. Id. at 238.
38. Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Brown Announces Major DNA Lab Expansion
(May 5, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1553.
39. Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous Prece-
dent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 202 (2005).  The felony of arson
was added after 2002 in an expansion of the Act’s list of qualifying offenders whom police were
permitted to retrieve DNA. Id.
40. Id. at 200.
41. Id. at 203.
42. Id. at 199.
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als in the state who are subject to warrantless DNA seizures to any-
one, even children, arrested on suspicion of committing any felony.43
The measure also applies retroactively to authorize collection of DNA
from all five hundred thousand Californians who are in prison, or on
probation or parole with a felony record.44  Consequently, the state’s
DNA database is expected to mushroom to more than two million
samples over the next five years.45
There was strong opposition to the law.  A range of advocacy
groups, including the California American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), the League of Women Voters, the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, the Children’s Defense Fund, and the American Con-
servative Union, objected to the initiative’s inclusion of arrestees for
undermining the principle of presumptive innocence, branding chil-
dren with lifetime suspicion, and wasting taxpayer money on the mon-
umental costs of DNA processing.46  According to the California
Department of Justice, of the approximately 332,000 people arrested
for felonies in California in 2007, more than 101,000 were not con-
victed of any crime.47  That means that roughly 30% of arrestees are
subject to DNA seizure without a determination of guilt.48
In 2009, the ACLU of Northern California filed a class-action
lawsuit arguing that Proposition 69 is unconstitutional because it sub-
jects innocent Californians to “a lifetime of genetic surveillance” that
constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.49
The named plaintiff, Lily Haskell, was arrested at a peace rally in San
Francisco and forced to provide a DNA sample, even though she was
quickly released without being charged with a crime.50  “When your
DNA is taken after an arrest at a political demonstration, it can have a
silencing effect on political action,” Haskell later said.51  “Now my ge-
43. Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Simoncelli & Steinhardt,
supra note 39, at 200.
44. Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 39, at 200 tbl.2, 200-02.
45. See id. at 201.
46. Vote No on Proposition 69, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL., http://ca.lwv.org/
action/prop0411/prop69.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (listing organizations supporting and op-
posing Proposition 69).
47. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d
1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 09-4779), 2009 WL 3269641.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 19-20.
50. ACLU Lawsuit Challenges California’s Mandatory DNA Collection at Arrest, ACLU
(Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-lawsuit-challenges-california-s-
mandatory-dna-collection-arrest.
51. Id.
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netic information is stored indefinitely in a government database, sim-
ply because I was exercising my right to speak out.”52  But the ACLU
lost its case.  A California federal judge ruled that the ACLU failed to
show that individual privacy rights outweigh the government’s com-
pelling interest in DNA profiling that works to “swiftly and accu-
rately” solve past and present crimes.53
In California, Colorado, and New York, the scope of genetic sur-
veillance extends to another category of people who have never been
suspected of a crime.54  In what is known as “familial searching,” in-
vestigators question relatives of people whose DNA is stored in the
government databank and pressure them to submit genetic samples to
avoid being implicated in a crime.55  Under this scheme, people be-
come candidates for inclusion based merely on their relationship to
someone previously profiled.56  Familial searching is used when a
crime scene sample fails to produce a perfect cold hit, but does pro-
vide a partial match to a DNA profile stored in the database.57  The
police track down close relatives, such as siblings, parents, or children,
of the partial matches and ask them to provide a DNA sample
through a cheek swab to compare with the crime scene evidence.58
Although submitting a sample is voluntary, refusing to submit one
looks suspicious.  Gathering samples from family members extends
state surveillance to yet another category of innocent citizens.  These
innocent citizens are trapped by a new form of suspicion based on
familial association.
II. THE COST OF SURVEILLANCE
Government DNA data banking began as a targeted procedure
to assist law enforcement in identifying perpetrators of a narrow set of
crimes.59  It has expanded into a form of state surveillance that en-
snares innocent people or petty offenders who have done little or
52. Id.
53. Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1202-03 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
54. Jeremy W. Peters, New Rule Allows Use of Partial DNA Matches, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/nyregion/25dna.html.
55. See KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 88.
56. Id.
57. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 64–88; Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties:
The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 250
(2006).
58. See generally KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 64-88 (discussing the process of
familial DNA searches and the policy issues surrounding the practice).
59. Id. at 28.
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nothing to warrant the collateral intrusion into their private lives.
Databanks no longer detect suspects—they create suspects from an
ever-growing list of categories.  Even so, the public shows little alarm
about the massive retention of genetic information because the bal-
ance between protecting individual privacy and keeping the streets
safe seems to fall in favor of more law enforcement.  DNA profiling is
a far more precise and objective method of identifying suspects com-
pared to less sophisticated law enforcement techniques, such as eye-
witness identification or smudge fingerprints found at a crime scene.60
Far from feeling threatened by this gigantic storehouse of genetic
data, many Americans see it as a surefire way of catching criminals
and ensuring that only guilty people are convicted of crimes.61  Storing
an innocent person’s DNA seems a small price for such a great public
good.
The countless cases where DNA data banking either yielded no
benefit or produced erroneous identifications received little attention
from the media.  Moreover, the public does not hear from the
thousands of innocent people whose DNA was seized and stored
against their will.  Although DNA testing has shed light on the injus-
tice of false convictions, it cannot solve the underlying problems that
lead innocent people to be convicted in the first place.  Most wrongful
convictions result from deep biases in the criminal justice system that
make poor, minority defendants vulnerable to police abuse, misiden-
tification, and inadequate representation.62  False confessions coerced
by the police are one of the main causes of wrongful convictions.63
According to the Innocence Project, “In about [twenty-five] percent
of DNA exoneration cases, innocent defendants made incriminating
statements, delivered outright confessions or pled guilty.”64  Coerced
60. See John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposal for Complete
DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119, 128-29 (2000).
61. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2002, at A2, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E05
E7DB1730F934A35756C0A9649C8B63 (stating that to minimize risks, a DNA statute should
limit testing of parts of the DNA code that identify individuals without revealing other medical
facts).
62. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrong-
ful Conviction Claims, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 692 (2008) (“[W]rongful convictions do not result
from a single flaw or mistake; many factors can be at the root of a wrongful conviction.  Such
factors may include biased police lineups, mistaken eyewitness identification, faulty forensic sci-
ence, coerced false confessions, and unreliable informants.” (internal citations omitted)).
63. False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
False-Confessions.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
64. The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/understand (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
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false confessions were a factor in fifteen of thirty-three exonerations
won by the Center on Wrongful Convictions.65  It makes no sense to
correct a problem created by law enforcement’s abuse of power by
handing over even more authority to law enforcement in the form of
DNA collection.  The way to reduce wrongful convictions is to remove
the biases based on race and class that corrupt our criminal justice
system.  Extending the reach of state surveillance does just the oppo-
site.  Besides, contrary to the public’s belief that DNA evidence is in-
fallible, there have been numerous cases of errors in the handling and
analysis of DNA that have led to false accusations and convictions of
innocent people.66
These weaknesses in the state’s use of DNA data banking as a
tool for reducing crime make it harder to justify the resulting breach
of individual privacy.  Society recognizes that the government violates
its civil liberties if it taps our telephones or secretly searches our
homes without court permission.67  Collecting and storing our DNA is
also a serious intrusion into our private lives because DNA is a part of
the body; taking it without consent violates our bodily integrity.  In
addition to this material aspect, DNA contains sensitive personal in-
formation that can be used to identify our family members and us, can
be matched with other private records, including medical files.68
Society tolerates the state forcibly extracting highly personal data
from people convicted of serious crimes because these offenders have
a diminished right to privacy as a result of their antisocial conduct.69
But as the categories of people who are compelled to submit DNA
broaden, it becomes less clear why the state should have so much
power over them.  Once compelled DNA collection goes beyond mur-
derers, rapists, and armed robbers, law enforcement’s need for a sus-
65. About Us, BLUHM L. CLINIC, CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, https://www.law.
northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/aboutus (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
66. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 140-41.
67. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guarding against unreasonable searches and
seizures when the searched party has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”); Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) (extending wiretap protections to in-
clude transmissions of electronic data by computers); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006) (setting rules for obtaining wiretap orders in the United
States).
68. See generally George J. Annas, Protecting Privacy and the Public—Limits on Police Use
of Bioidentifiers in Europe, 361 N. ENG. J. MED. 196, 196-201 (2009) (explaining that bioiden-
tifiers implicate privacy even more than answers on tax returns since they directly identify
individuals).
69. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SUMMARY OF THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
(“UCR”) PROGRAM 2 (2010), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/documents/about
ucrmain.pdf.
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pect’s DNA lessens and the right to retain control over their private
information strengthens.70  Although people convicted of heinous
crimes may forfeit their claim to privacy, there is no such justification
for seizing genetic samples from someone who has, say, forged a
check.  State agents should be required to obtain informed consent to
take or test DNA from anyone who has not been convicted of a seri-
ous crime.
Although U.S. courts have been slow to recognize this threat to
civil liberties,71 in 2008, the European Court of Human Rights unani-
mously held that the United Kingdom’s storage of DNA for purposes
of criminal investigation infringed privacy rights protected by Article
8 of the European Convention.72  The European Court was especially
troubled by the indefinite retention of genetic information taken from
children and adults who were never convicted of a crime,73 stigma-
tizing them as if they were convicted criminals.  This equation of the
innocent and the guilty disregards the presumption of innocence ac-
corded to citizens in a democracy.  Massive government collection of
DNA transforms the relationship between citizens and their govern-
ment in ways that contradict basic democratic principles.74  Govern-
ment becomes the watchdog of citizens instead of the other way
around.  Although they are guilty of no wrongdoing, huge segments of
the population are perpetually under suspicion.  Citizens can no
longer rely on the state to safeguard their privacy by forgetting their
past behavior because evidence about them is stored forever.75  The
state has the authority to take citizens’ private property—in this case,
their genetic information—without due process.76  Those are features
of a totalitarian state, not a liberal democracy.
III. JIM CROW DATABASES
These privacy violations are exacerbated by the racial inequities
that plague every part of the U.S. criminal justice system.  The most
stunning aspect of this injustice is the mass incarceration of African
70. Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Oct. 29, 2009), http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/264/debating-DNA.htm.
71. Annas, supra note 68, at 198.
72. S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30562 (2008).
73. Id.
74. See Berson, supra note 70.
75. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (arguing that “the rise of the National Surveillance State portends
the death of amnesia”).
76. See Berson, supra note 70.
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American men.77  Radical changes in crime control, drug, and sen-
tencing policies over the last thirty years produced an explosion in the
U.S. prison population from three hundred thousand to two million
inmates.78  Additionally, the United States has the highest rate of in-
carceration in the world at a magnitude unprecedented in the history
of Western democracies.79  The gap between black and white incarcer-
ation rates has increased along with rising inmate numbers.80  Black
men are eight times as likely as white men to be behind bars.81  One in
nine black men aged twenty to thirty-four is in prison or in jail.82  In
fact, most people sentenced to prison today are black.83  In her 2010
book, The New Jim Crow, legal scholar Michelle Alexander demon-
strates that black incarceration functions like a modern-day Jim Crow
caste system because it “permanently locks a huge percentage of the
African American community out of the mainstream society and
economy,” replicating the subjugated status of blacks that prevailed
before the civil rights revolution.84
The targeted imprisonment of black men is translated into the
disproportionate storage of their genetic profiles in state and federal
databases.  We can look to the United Kingdom to gauge the likely
racial impact of our own federal database now that it has surpassed
theirs in size.  Their database reveals that 40% of all black men and
77% of black men aged fifteen to thirty-five, compared with only 6%
of white men, were estimated to have genetic profiles in the UK na-
tional DNA database in 2006.85  Also in 2006, Stanford bioethicist
Hank Greely estimated that at least 40% of the genetic profiles in the
U.S. federal database were from African Americans, although they
77. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73 (2004).
78. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6 (2010); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 1-2 (2006); Loı̈c
Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010,
at 74.
79. See Roberts, supra note 77, at 1272.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1274.
82. Why Are 1 in 9 Young Black Men in Prison?, NAACP OF OTERO CNTY., N.M., http://
naacpoc.org/2008/03/why-are-1-in-9-young-black-men-in-prison/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
83. See Roberts, supra note 77, at 1272.
84. ALEXANDER, supra note 78, at 13.
85. Ben Leapman, Three in Four Young Black Men on the DNA Database, TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 5, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1533295/Three-in-four-
young-black-men-on-the-DNA-database.html; Matilda MacAttram, How the Government’s
DNA Crusade Is Criminalising Innocent Black Britons, VOICE ONLINE (July 13, 2009), http://
www.voice-online.co.uk/content.php?show=15859.
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make up only 13% of the national population.86  Sheldon Krimsky
and Tania Simoncelli arrive at a similar estimate in which 41% to 49%
of CODIS profiles are from African Americans.87
The extension of DNA collection by the federal government and
a number of states to people who are only arrested—as opposed to
charged or convicted—brings many more whites into the system, but
it is also on its way to creating a nearly universal database for urban
black men.88  These men are arrested so routinely that upwards of
90% would be included in databases if the collection policy is strictly
enforced.89  In April 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed a
controversial law giving police broad authority to detain anyone sus-
pected of being in the country illegally.90  This law is held up as a
model for immigration enforcement policy in other states.91  When
combined with congressional authorization of DNA sampling from all
federal detainees,92 these immigration laws will cause the number of
Latino profiles in CODIS and state databases to skyrocket.
Police routinely consider race in their decision to stop and detain
an individual.93  A New York Times/CBS News Poll conducted in July
2008 asked: “Have you ever felt you were stopped by the police just
because of your race or ethnic background?”94  Sixty-six percent of
black men said yes, compared to only 9% of white men.95  The United
States Supreme Court has authorized police to use race in determin-
ing whether there is reasonable cause to suspect someone is involved
in crime.96  Michelle Alexander calls the Court’s license to discrimi-
nate the “dirty little secret of policing.”97  In recent decades, a con-
servative Supreme Court has eroded the Warren Court’s protections
86. Greely et al., supra note 57, at 258.
87. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 258.
88. See id. at 34-35, 257.
89. See Kaye & Smith, supra note 16, at 270.
90. See Julia Preston, Political Battle on Illegal Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
1, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/01/us/01immig.html?nl=todayshead
lines; see generally 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 113 (West) (outlining Arizona’s attempt to discourage
the entrance and presence of illegal aliens).
91. See generally Preston, supra note 90, at A1 (discussing the Arizona law’s strong influ-
ence on other states).
92. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 14, at 32-38.
93. ALEXANDER, supra note 78, at 128–36; see DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16–55 (1999).
94. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Welcome to the ‘Club,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A23,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/25/opinion/25blow.html.
95. Id.
96. See U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-87 (1975); ALEXANDER, supra note 78, at
128.
97. ALEXANDER, supra note 78, at 128.
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against police abuse in ways that promote the arrest of blacks and
Latinos—relaxing, for example, the standard for reasonable suspi-
cion—and has blocked legal channels for challenging racial bias on
the part of law enforcement.98
There is overwhelming evidence that police officers stop motor-
ists on the basis of race for minor traffic violations, such as failure to
signal a lane change, often as a pretext to search the vehicle for
drugs.99  One of the first confirmations of this was a 1992 Orlando
Sentinel study of police videotapes that discovered that, while blacks
and Latinos represented only 5% of drivers on the Florida interstate
highway, they comprised nearly 70% of drivers pulled over by police
and more than 80% of those drivers whose cars were searched.100  A
study of police stops on the New Jersey Turnpike similarly found that,
although only 15% of all motorists were minorities, 42% of all stops
and 73% of all arrests were of black drivers.101  In Maryland, only
21% of drivers along a stretch of I-95 outside of Baltimore were Afri-
can Americans, Asians, or Latinos, but these groups made up nearly
80% of those who were stopped and searched.102  Likewise, an Illinois
state police drug interdiction program, known as Operation Valkyrie,
targeted a disproportionate number of Latinos, who comprised less
than 8% of the Illinois population but 30% of the drivers stopped by
drug interdiction officers for petty traffic offenses.103
Police officers also make drug arrests in a racially biased manner.
Although whites use drugs in greater numbers than blacks, blacks are
far more likely to be arrested for drug offenses—and, therefore, far
more likely to end up in genetic databases.104  The latest National Sur-
vey on Drug Use and Health, released in February 2010, confirms that
young blacks aged eighteen to twenty-five years old are less likely to
98. See Jose Felipe Anderson, Accountability Solutions in the Consent Search and Seizure
Wasteland, 79 NEB. L. REV. 711, 712-18 (2000); see also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-87
(approving race as a factor to determine whether probable cause exists).
99. See generally DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CAN-
NOT WORK (2002) (reviewing studies showing racial profiling by police officers).
100. See Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Drivers Is Key to Stops on I-95 Videos, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at A1, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-08-
23/news/9208230541_1_stop-and-search-sentinel-drivers-stopped.
101. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d. 350, 353 n.3, 354 n.6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
102. HARRIS, supra note 99, at 80.
103. DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NA-
TION’S HIGHWAYS 3, 27-28 (1999) available at http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-
black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways.
104. See Matching the Picture to the Protest, QUILL, Mar. 1, 1991, at 6, available at 1991
WLNR 4670893.
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use illegal drugs than the national average.105  Yet, black men are
twelve times more likely than white men to be sent to prison on drug
charges.106  This staggering racial disparity results in part from the de-
liberate decision of police departments to target their drug enforce-
ment efforts on urban and inner-city neighborhoods where people of
color live.  Indeed, the increase in both the prison population and its
racial disparity in recent decades are largely attributable to aggressive
street-level enforcement of the drug laws and harsh sentencing of drug
offenders.107
A crusade of marijuana arrests in New York City in the last dec-
ade provides a shocking illustration.108  Since 1997, the New York Po-
lice Department (“NYPD”) has arrested 430,000 people for
possessing tiny amounts of marijuana, usually carried in their pock-
ets.109  In 2008 alone, the NYPD arrested and jailed 40,300 people for
the infraction.110  Even more alarming is the extreme racial bias
shown in whom the police target for arrest.  Although U.S. govern-
ment studies consistently show that young whites smoke marijuana at
the highest rates, white New Yorkers are the least likely of any group
to be arrested.111  In 2008, whites made up over 35% of the city’s pop-
ulation but less than 10% of the people arrested for marijuana posses-
sion.112  Instead, the NYPD has concentrated arrests on young blacks
and Latinos.  Police arrested blacks and Latinos for marijuana posses-
sion at seven and four times the rate of whites, respectively.113
The racist marijuana policing strategy is based on the routine po-
lice practice of stopping, frisking, and intimidating young blacks and
Latinos.  According to Harry Levine, the City University of New York
105. See NAT’L SURVEY ON DRUG USE & HEALTH REPORT, SUBSTANCE USE AMONG
BLACK ADULTS 5 (2010), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k10/174/174SubUseBlack
Adults.htm.
106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING BLACKS: DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AND RACE
IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62236/section/1.
107. Id. at 16.
108. HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MA-
RIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY, 1997–2007,
at 5 (2008), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST-CRUSADE_Final.
pdf; Harry G. Levine et al., Drug Arrests and DNA: Building Jim Crow’s Database 6 (June 19,
2008) (unpublished paper) (on file with author), available at http://dragon.soc.qc.cuny.edu/Staff/
levine/Building-Jim-Crows-Database—-Drug-Arrests-and-DNA—Levine.pdf.
109. Harry G. Levine, The Epidemic of Pot Arrests in New York City, ALTERNET (Aug. 10,
2009), http://www.alternet.org/story/141866/the_epidemic_of_pot_arrests_in_new_york_city/.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
2011] 581
Howard Law Journal
sociologist who exposed the arrest campaign, “In 2008, the NYPD
made more than half a million recorded stop and frisks and an un-
known number of unrecorded stops, disproportionately in black, La-
tino and low-income neighborhoods.”114  Although New York City is
the “marijuana arrest capital of the world,” other cities like Atlanta,
Baltimore, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Phoenix
are also arresting and jailing huge numbers of blacks and Latinos for
marijuana possession.115
The widespread arrests of young blacks and Latinos for mari-
juana possession and other petty offenses, such as truancy,
skateboarding, and playing loud music, have devastating conse-
quences.  A first-time offender who pleads guilty to felony marijuana
possession has a permanent criminal record that can block him or her
from getting a student loan, a job, a professional license, food stamps,
welfare benefits, or public housing.116  Even if they avoid prison on a
first offense, those who are arrested a second time risk a harsh sen-
tence for being a repeat offender.117  In addition to harsh sentencing, a
lifetime of genetic surveillance can now be added to the long list of
collateral consequences created by discriminatory arrests.
IV. RACIAL HARMS
Racial disparities in DNA databanks make communities of color
the most vulnerable to state surveillance and suspicion.118  The dispro-
portionate odds faced by blacks and Latinos of having their DNA ex-
tracted and stored will, in turn, intensify the racial disparities that
already exist in the criminal justice system.  People whose DNA is in
criminal databases have a greater chance of being matched to crime
scene evidence.  While a guilty person may have no right to complain,
that is no excuse for unfairly placing certain racial groups at greater
risk of detection.  Blacks and Latinos have greater odds of being ge-
114. Id.; see also Blow, supra note 94; Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police
Stops, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyre
gion/12frisk.html.
115. LEVINE, supra note 108; see also Charles M. Blow, Smoke and Horrors, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/opinion/23blow.html; Bob
Herbert, Anger Has Its Place, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/08/01/opinion/01herbert.html.
116. ALEXANDER, supra note 78, at 139-40.
117. Id. at 140.
118. OBASOGIE, supra note 8, at 43.
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netically profiled largely because of discriminatory police practices.119
Moreover, people whose profiles are entered in DNA databases be-
come subject to a host of errors that can lead to being falsely accused
of a crime.  As the federal government and a growing number of
states extend the scope of DNA collection to innocent people, they
are imposing this unmerited risk primarily on minorities.
The problem is not only that all of these harms are placed dispro-
portionately on people of color, but also that the dangers of state
databanks are multiplied when applied to blacks and Latinos because
these groups are already at a disadvantage when they encounter the
criminal justice system.  Blacks and Latinos have fewer resources than
whites to challenge abuses and mistakes by law enforcement officers
and forensic analysts.120  They are stereotyped as criminals before any
DNA evidence is produced, making them more vulnerable to the
myth of DNA infallibility.121  “The experience of being mistaken for a
criminal is almost a rite of passage for African-American men,” writes
journalist Brent Staples.122  One of the main tests applied by a dis-
turbing number of Americans to distinguish law-abiding from lawless
people is their race.
Many, if not most, Americans believe that black people are prone
to violence and make race-based assessments of the danger posed by
strangers they encounter.123  One of the most telling reflections of the
presumption of black criminality is biased reporting of crime by white
victims and eyewitnesses.124  Psychological studies show a substan-
tially greater rate of error in cross-racial identifications when the wit-
ness is white and the suspect is black.125  White witnesses
disproportionately misidentify blacks because they expect to see black
criminals.126  According to Cornell legal scholar Sheri Lynn Johnson,
“This expectation is so strong that whites may observe an interracial
119. Simon A. Cole, How Much Justice Can Technology Afford? The Impact of DNA Tech-
nology on Equal Criminal Justice, 34 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 100 (2007).
120. See Beverly Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of
Law and the Legal System, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DIS-
COURSE 148, 159 (Beverly Moran ed., 2008).
121. Cole, supra note 119.
122. Brent Staples, Even Now, There’s Risk in ‘Driving While Black,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
2009, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/15/opinion/15mon4.html.
123. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 934, 950 (1984).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 949.
126. Id.
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scene in which a white person is the aggressor, yet remember the
black person as the aggressor.”127
In numerous carefully staged experiments, social psychologists
have documented how people’s quick judgments about the criminal
acts of others are influenced by implicit bias—positive or negative
preferences for a social category, such as race or gender, based on
unconscious stereotypes and attitudes that people do not even realize
they hold.128  Whites who are trying to figure out a blurred object on a
computer screen can identify it as a weapon faster after they are ex-
posed to a black face.129  Exposure to a white face has the opposite
effect.130  Research participants playing a video game that simulates
encounters with armed and unarmed targets react faster and are more
likely to shoot when the target is black.131  The implicit association
between blacks and crime is so powerful that it supersedes reality; it
predisposes whites to see black people as criminals.  Most wrongful
convictions occurred after witnesses misidentified the defendant.132
Databanks filled with DNA extracted from guilty and innocent black
men alike will enforce and magnify the very stereotypes of black crim-
inality that lead to so many wrongful convictions in the first place.
Collecting DNA from huge numbers of African Americans who
are merely arrested, with no proof of wrongdoing, embeds the sordid
myth of black criminality into state policy.  As databanks swell with
DNA from black people who are arrested or convicted on petty of-
fenses and as their relatives also come under suspicion in states with
familial searching, the government effectively treats every black per-
son in many communities as a criminal suspect.  It seemingly also le-
gitimizes the myth that blacks have a genetic propensity to commit
crime.
In 2010, Florida State University criminologist Kevin Beaver pub-
lished a widely reported study claiming to show that young men with
the low-activity form of the monoamine oxidase A (“MAOA”)
gene—dubbed by the press as the “warrior gene”—were more likely
127. Id. at 950.
128. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881 (2004).
129. Id. at 880.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 889.
132. Tanya Eiserer, Faulty Eyewitness Identifications Leading Cause of Wrongful Convic-
tions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 4, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/arch
ives/2009/10/the-case-seemed-rock-solid.html.
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to join gangs than those who had the high-activity version of the
MAOA gene.133  He concluded that “male carriers of low MAOA ac-
tivity alleles are at risk for becoming a gang member and, once a gang
member, are at risk for using weapons in a fight.”134  The public, who
already implicitly associates blacks with violence, may link research
claiming that genes cause gangbanging and aggression to the dispro-
portionate incarceration of African Americans along with the dispro-
portionate banking of African Americans’ genetic profiles, to reach
the false conclusion that blacks are more likely to possess these crime-
producing traits—or even that most blacks actually possess them.
Americans will become even more indifferent to racial injustice in law
enforcement if they are convinced that black people belong behind
bars because of their genetic predilection to crime.
CONCLUSION
Despite the racial harms of DNA data banking, civil rights advo-
cacy groups have done little to challenge the threat posed by govern-
ment genetic surveillance.  Their silence stems from a tension
surrounding DNA testing.  Although it is serving an unjust criminal
justice system, DNA technology is also responsible for one of the big-
gest successes in criminal justice reform.  As of 2010, more than half
(151 out of 254) post-conviction DNA exonerations involved African
Americans.135  There could not be a better public-relations campaign
for DNA than the compelling stories of falsely imprisoned people re-
leased after DNA testing.  As criminologist Simon Cole notes, “At
first glance, post-conviction DNA exonerations appear to be a power-
ful example of the use of technoscience to offset social inequality.”136
Civil rights organizations that may have ordinarily opposed the expan-
sion of DNA databanks because of their intrusion into communities of
color instead embrace DNA technology as a result of its ability to ex-
onerate victims of the system.  However, while it appears DNA
databanks would decrease mass incarceration, this Article has argued
that DNA databanks are actually more likely to intensify it and its
collateral consequences.
133. Kevin M. Beaver et al., Monoamine Oxidase A Genotype Is Associated with Gang Mem-
bership and Weapon Use, 51 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 130, 132 (2010).
134. Id.
135. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocencepro
ject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_ENA_Exonerations.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
136. Cole, supra note 119, at 99.
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Champions for racial justice who support expanded DNA
databanks or are silent about them should not make the mistake of
embracing DNA technology without analyzing its full role in the crim-
inal justice system.137  Although DNA testing can correct injustices
when used narrowly to confirm a suspect’s guilt or innocence, the
massive genetic surveillance we are witnessing threatens to reinforce
the racial roots of the very injustices that need to be corrected.
Wrongful convictions are a symptom of our Jim Crow system of crimi-
nal justice, which is systematically biased against blacks and Lati-
nos.138  Creating a Jim Crow database filled with their genetic profiles
only intensifies this travesty of justice, adding yet another collateral
consequence of criminal injustice and fortifying a dangerous biopolit-
ics of race.
137. See, e.g., Joel Stonington, State All-Crimes Databank Proposed, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2010, at A25, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039612045752807328
11781468.html (illustrating elected officials, such as Governor David Paterson and President Ba-
rack Obama, who support expanded DNA collection).
138. Cole, supra note 119, at 100.
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